11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(3) 11 U.S.C. §1325(b)(1)(B) Best Effort Good Faith

<u>Pacific First Corporation v. Merrill</u> BAP No. OR-89-1526 MeVJ <u>In Re Merrill</u> Bk. No. 388-03360-H13

4/20/90 BAP (affirming J. Hess) Unpublished

The debtor's proposed chapter 13 plan paid no dividend to nonpriority unsecured creditors. One such unsecured creditor held a claim which had been determined nondischargeable in a prior chapter 7 case. That creditor objected to confirmation, alleging that the plan was not proposed in good faith as required by \$1325(a)(3). The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan, finding it in good faith.

The BAP affirmed, stating that where a creditor objects to a Chapter 13 plan that proposes zero payment on a debt which would be nondischargeable in a chapter 7, careful scrutiny of the debtor's good faith is appropriate. In making that determination, the court must look at the debtor's entire circumstances. Here, the creditor failed to demonstrate that the procedures of the trial court were flawed or that the good faith issue was judged by improper criteria.

The elements of the plan suggest good faith. All the debtor's disposable income was committed to the plan for a five year period. All secured and priority debts were to be paid in full.

P90-19(7)

FILED

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re) BAP No. OR-89-1526 MeVJ
MICHAEL F. MERRILL,) BK No. 388-03360-H13
Debtor.))))
FIRST PACIFIC CORPORATION, an Oregon corporation, dba CENTRAL DATA SYSTEMS,))))
Appellant,) MEKORANDUM
v.))
MICHAEL F. MERRILL, aka MICHAEL F. MERRILL, D.M.D., P.C.,)))
Appellee.))

Argued and Submitted October 19, 1989 at Portland, Oregon

Filed: APR 2 0 1990

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon
Honorable Henry L. Hess, Jr., Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: MEYERS, VOLINN and JONES, Bankruptcy Judges

P90-19(1)

Alleging a lack of good faith by debtor in proposing his repayment plan under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code"), Appellant creditor objected to its confirmation. The trial court confirmed the plan and thereafter denied creditor's Motion to Reconsider. We AFFIRM.

II.

FACTS

Michael F. Merrill ("Merrill"), the Appellee and debtor, instituted Chapter 7 proceedings in 1986. As part of those proceedings, the \$54,000 debt then owing by Merrill to Appellant Central Data Systems ("Central Data") was reduced to judgment by an Order of the bankruptcy court. The Order held that this debt was not dischargeable in Chapter 7 since it stemmed from Merrill's embezzlement of Central Data funds.

Merrill made small periodic payments on the debt to Central Data but in 1988 he filed under Chapter 13 of the Code. His plan proposes payment in full to secured and priority creditors in amounts totalling \$276,000 over a 60 month period. Merrill asserts that throughout this period he would be devoting all of his current disposable earnings to the plan, a claim apparently not disputed by Central Data.

Merrill's plan was confirmed following a telephonic hearing in which neither Central Data nor its Counsel participated. Central Data moved to reconsider the confirmation on grounds that it never received formal notice of the Chapter 13 proceedings and learned informally of the confirmation hearing too late to file objections to the plan. After a reconsideration hearing, Central Data's motion was denied. No transcript is supplied by Appellants of either the confirmation hearing or the hearing on the motion to reconsider.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

where a creditor argues that the debtor lacked good faith in proposing the plan. First, since the procedures and criteria used by the bankruptcy court are derived from statutes and their construction, they are assessed de novo. See In re Porter, 102 B.R. 773, 775 (9th Cir. BAP 1989); In re Klein, 57 B.R. 818, 819 (9th Cir. BAP 1985). If the procedures and criteria are held to have been properly formulated by the trial court, findings of fact made pursuant to them may be overturned only if clearly erroneous. Bankruptcy Rule 8013; Porter, supra, 102 B.R. at 775; In re Metz, 67 B.R. 462, 466 (9th Cir. BAP 1986), aff'd Matter of Metz, 820 F.2d 1495, 1497 (9th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION

Where a creditor objects to a Chapter 13 plan that proposes zero payment on a debt that would not be dischargeable under Chapter 7, careful scrutiny of the debtor's good faith is appropriate. According to In re Warren, 89 B.R. 87, 91-92 (9th Cir. BAP 1988), the creditor must be afforded the opportunity to raise issues speaking to the "totality of circumstances" surrounding the nature and reorganization of the debt. See In re Chinichian, 784 F.2d 1440, 1445-46 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Goeb, 675 F.2d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Metz, supra, 67 B.R. at 464.

It is Appellant's responsibility to provide a record that is adequate for assessing whether these procedures were followed. In re Burkhart, 84 B.R. 658, 660-61 (9th Cir. BAP 1988). See also In re Pederson, 875 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1989). In this case no transcript appears in the record by which such a determination might be made. In the absence of properly framed arguments or documentation, we decline to reverse on the basis of inadequate procedures below. See In re Anderson, 69 B.R. 105, 109 (9th Cir. BAP 1986).

Substantively, the good faith of a debtor in a "superdischarge" case under Chapter 13 is governed by the factors outlined in <u>Warren</u>, factors which we specifically

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reaffirm. Under those standards a nominal payment by the debtor to a creditor with a Chapter 7 nondischargeability claim does not necessarily constitute bad faith. Warren, supra, 89 B.R. at Accord, Porter, supra, 102 B.R. at 776; Goeb, supra, 675 F.2d at 1391; <u>In re Slade</u>, 15 B.R. 910, 912 (9th Cir. BAP On the other hand, the fact that the debtor's plan represents the debtor's "best efforts" under Code Section 1325(b)(1)(B) is not conclusive toward establishing good faith; rather, the Warren inquiry involves consideration of a number of quideline elements. Warren, supra, 89 B.R. at 93. Goeb, supra, 675 F.2d at 1390-91; Matter of Kull, 12 B.R. 654, 659 (S.D.Ga. 1981).

Although the instant Record does not reveal the factors used by the trial court in determining good faith, the case of In re Rimqale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982) was cited by the court. Rimgale is not inconsistent with Warren. In particular, it holds that the good faith requirement:

> ... imposes a considerable responsibility on bankruptcy judges. ... The legislative history suggests that Congress intended Chapter 13 for the benefit of debtors who could, given time, satisfy their creditors in full or in substantial measure [although they did not set an arbitrary minimum The payment percentage]. . . . approach ... is to treat the issues of substantiality and best efforts as elements of good faith. Unless the courts have discretion to consider such factors, the danger exists that Chapter 13 plans could become shams that would emasculate the safeguards that Congress has included in

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Chapter 7 to prevent debtor abuse of the bankruptcy laws. The courts discretion to prevent such abuse, and that discretion can be exercised effectively through a meaningful interpretation of the good faith requirement of § 1325(a)(3). case, the bankruptcy court consider the debtor's entire circumstances to determine whether his plan proposes to meaningful payments to unsecured creditors.

Rimgale, supra, 669 F.2d at 431-32 (see also good faith factors listed at n. 14).

Central Data has not demonstrated on appeal that the court failed to consider these factors. Appellant does not dispute, for example, that the debtor would be devoting his best efforts to repayment of debts by paying out 100% of his disposable income. Code Section 1325(b)(1)(B). This full payout of disposable income is ensured by the plan's income escalation provision that calls for larger payments to be made by Merrill later in the plan period. Also beyond question are the facts that the five years of the plan is well beyond the statutory minimum period and that all secured and priority debts are to be paid in full under the plan.

v.

CONCLUSION

Appellant has failed to demonstrate either that the procedures of the trial court were flawed or that the good faith

issue was judged by improper criteria. On the contrary, elements of the plan suggest good faith and are sufficient to meet our review of the ruling of the trial court.

AFFIRMED.